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I.
PARTIES
All parties to this proceeding are listed on the cover of this Brief. Appellant is Defendant
Martineau & Company ("Martineau"). Appellees are Plaintiffs Daniel A. Miller and David M.
Kimball ("Miller and Kimball").
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IV.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j) by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2.
V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

Did the trial court improperly conclude that Daniel A. Miller and David M.

Kimball ("Miller and Kimball") owed no contractual obligation to honor Martineau's lease? This
issue presents questions of law and the application of the law to the facts. Appellate courts
afford no particular deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review the trial court's
conclusions for correctness. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).
B.

Did the trial court incorrectly allow foreclosure by Miller and Kimball after they

had acquired both the mortgaged property and the debt securing that mortgage under
circumstances "designed" to discourage participation by the public at a foreclosure sale? This
issue presents a question of law and fact. The Appellate Court should afford no particular
deference to the trial court's conclusion of law, but should review it for correctness. Scharfv.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). The Appellate Court should not set aside the trial
court's factual findings unless they are "clearly erroneous, i.e. if the findings . . . are against the
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." Brixen and Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d
1039 (Utah App. 1989).
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C.

i)i»i the trial court improperly rely upon the Default Judgment and the timing of
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VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE:

Martineau seeks to preserve its leasehold interest against a contractual breach and an
improper foreclosure of Miller and Kimball's artificial debt to themselves. Martineau also seeks
to reverse a $20,000 judgment for attorney's fees granted by the trial court in connection with the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
B.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:

1.

Appellees' predecessor began a judicial foreclosure of a 1986 Trust Deed affecting

the Judge Building in Salt Lake City on January 8, 1992 by the filing of a Complaint in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. (R. 1-54).
2.

On February 11, 1992, the foreclosure Complaint was amended to add Martineau,

a tenant in the Judge Building. The Amended Complaint sought a judicial determination that
Martineau's leasehold interest was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 87-139).
3.

Because Martineau's lease was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed, Martineau

allowed the court to enter a default judgment, limited to the proposition that Martineau's lease
was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. The Default Judgment was entered March 3, 1993. (R.
472-475).
4.

During the pendency of the foreclosure action and on the basis of the

extraordinary documentation and the transaction described in the Statement of Facts below,
Miller and Kimball purchased the Judge Building and became substitute Plaintiffs in the

3

foreclosure action. Concurrently, certain Defendants were dismissed and/or released from
liability on the 1986 Trust Deed Note. (R. 798-837).
5.

On November 24, 1993, Martineau entered an appearance in the case and moved

the court to restrain the pending foreclosure sale and to dismiss the foreclosure Complaint on the
basis of transactions which took place after the Default Judgment. (R. 877-886).
6.

On November 24, 1993, the trial court verbally granted the request for restraining

order, but never issued a written order. The pending Sheriffs sale was cancelled.
7.

The parties, by verbal stipulation, postponed any further legal proceedings during

discussions of settlement.
8.

On October 7, 1994, Martineau also moved to set aside the earlier default

judgment. (R. 972-974). This precautionary filing by Appellant was made in response to
Appellees' counsel's concern that such a motion was necessary to fully resolve pending issues.
9.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary "preliminary hearing" on January 19,

1995. It considered (a) the issue of whether to issue a preliminary injunction on the pending
foreclosure sale, (b) Martineau's Motion to Dismiss the foreclosure action, and (c) Martineau's
Motion to Set Aside the prior default judgment. (R. 1436-1558).
10.

On January 19, 1995, the trial court decided, from the bench, that the Default

Judgment issues were dispositive and that the Default Judgment should stand. (R. 1549-1553).
On or about June 29, 1995, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, denying Martineau's motions. (R. 1284-1288, Addendum No. 13). On May 26, 1995, the
trial court ordered completion of the pending foreclosure. (R. 1282-83).
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11.

On May 24, 1996, the trial court entered an order awarding Miller and Kimball

the sum of $20,000 for legal fees under Rule 65A. (R. 1329-1334, Addendum No. 14).
12.

Martineau filed its Notice of Appeal on June 21, 1996. (R. 1337-1339).

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

1.

On March 6, 1986, Judge Building Associates ("Associates") became the owner

of real property ("Property") located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Property is
commonly known as the Judge Building. The same day, Associates executed a Trust Deed with
Assignment of Leases ("the 1986 Trust Deed") on the Property in favor of Republic Savings and
Loan Association ("Lender") to secure a $2,300,000 note. (R. 15-38).
2.

On November 13, 1990, Associates entered into a lease agreement ("Lease") with

Martineau covering certain space located on the 5th floor of the Property. (R. 1165, Addendum
2).
3.

Since the commencement of the Lease, Martineau has continuously occupied such

5th floor space through the current time. (R. 1498).
4.

Martineau has never been in default of the Lease and has made timely payment of

all of its obligations thereunder. (R. 1497).
5.

In the fall of 1992, Associates (owner and landlord) became delinquent in its

monthly obligations to the Lender. (R. 84).
6.

On January 8, 1992, Lender filed a Complaint with this Court to initiate a judicial

foreclosure proceeding of the 1986 Trust Deed. The Complaint alleged an unpaid balance owing
to Lender from Associates of approximately $2,200,000. (R. 1-54).
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7.

Subsequently, on February 11, 1992, Lender amended its Complaint to join

Martineau as a Defendant in an attempt to terminate the Martineau Lease through the foreclosure.
(R. 87-139).
8.

No other existing tenants in the Judge Building were joined as Defendants. (R.

87-139).
9.

The Amended Complaint sought no monetary relief against Martineau, but

alleged only that the Lease was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 94, 98).
10.

Because the Lease was subordinate to the Trust Deed at such time, Martineau did

not file an Answer to the Amended Complaint. A Default Judgment was entered on March 5,
1993, finding that the Lease was subordinate to the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 472-475).
11.

On June 21, 1993, during the pendency of the foreclosure action and in

cooperation with the Lender, Associates sold the Property to Miller and Kimball. The total
purchase price was $750,000. Miller and Kimball made a down payment of $200,000 and
executed a new Trust Deed ("new Trust Deed") and Note of $550,000 in favor of Lender. (R.
1116-17).
12.

A convoluted set of sales documents was prepared in an attempt to allow Miller

and Kimball to foreclose against themselves for the sole purpose of terminating the Martineau
Lease, while protecting the position of the Lender on its new Trust Deed. Among the legal
gymnastics concocted to try to achieve such result were:
a.

Lender assigned to Miller and Kimball the beneficial interest of the

original 1986 Trust Deed, as well as the right to collect the unpaid balance on the original
$2,300,000 Note. (R. 1165, Addendum 7).
6

b.

Miller and Kimball then subordinated their beneficial interest in the 1986

Trust Deed to the new Trust Deed held by Lender. (R. 1155-1158, Addendum No. 8).
c.

Associates and its principals were released from any liability on the

original $2,300,000 note to Lender. (R. 1165, Addendum 4 p. 12).
d.

Miller and Kimball were substituted as Plaintiffs in this action. (R. 798-

e.

Associates and its principals were dismissed as Defendants in this

837).

litigation. (R. 798-837).
f.

As part of the transaction, Miller and Kimball executed an Assignment of

Leases ("Assignment of Leases") in favor of Lender as additional collateral to secure the
new debt to Lender. (R. 1165, Addendum 9).
13.

As a result of the sales transaction, Miller and Kimball took over ownership and

management of Property and became Martineau's landlord. Martineau has continued to pay rent
under the Lease to Miller and Kimball. (R. 1498).
14.

Following completion of their purchase of the Judge Building, Miller and Kimball

sought to complete the pending judicial foreclosure. Because Miller and Kimball already owned
the Judge Building which they were foreclosing, the sole remaining purpose of the foreclosure
was to terminate Martineau's Lease (and no other existing tenant's lease). Because of the
subordination of Trust Deeds, any interested buyer at the foreclosure sale would now have to bid
$2,200,000 and would still be subject to Lender's new Trust Deed of $550,000. Essentially,
Miller and Kimball were foreclosing against themselves to terminate one selected lease in the
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Judge Building, having previously released the original obligor of the 1986 Trust Deed
(Associates) from any further liability. (R. 1165, Addendum No. 4, p. 12).
15.

Martineau did not become aware of the terms of the July, 1993 transaction to

Miller and Kimball, including the convoluted sales documentation, until after the sale was
completed.
16.

When Martineau became aware of the existence of documentation designed solely

to eliminate his leasehold interest, Martineau sought a Temporary Restraining Order from the
trial court to stop the pending Sheriffs sale. (R. 877-879, Statement of the Case, supra.)
17.

The new Trust Deed contains, inter alia, the following covenant made by Miller

and Kimball:
Borrower shall comply with and observe Borrower's obligations as
landlord under all leases of the Property or any part thereof.
[Paragraph 16.]
(R. 1165, Addendum 6 p.12).
18.

The Assignment of Leases contains, inter alia, the following covenant made by

Miller and Kimball:
Assignor agrees:
(a) to observe and perform all obligations imposed upon lessor
under the Leases. [Paragraph 2.]
"Leases" is earlier defined in such document as:
. . . ail leases . . . now existing or hereafter entered into for all or
any part of the premises . . . . [emphasis added.]
(R. 1165, Addendum 9 p. 1).
19.

One of the lessor's covenants of the Martineau Lease states:
8

(b) Lessee hereby subordinates its rights in this Lease to the lien of
any mortgage or deed of trust of lien or other security interest
resulting from any method of financing or refinancing which
encumbers or is intended to encumber the Building or the land
underlying such and to all advances subsequently made upon the
strength of such security. So long as Lessee is not in default
under the terms of this Lease, however, this Lease shall remain
in full force and effect for the full term hereof and shall not be
terminated as a result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu
thereof) of such mortgage or other security instrument to
which Lessee has subordinated its rights pursuant to this
Subparagraph, [emphasis added.]
(R. 1165, Addendum 2, paragraph 33.)

VIIL
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its acquisition documentation, Miller and Kimball agreed to honor the original Lease
with Martineau. Such Lease guaranteed Martineau that it would retain the right to occupy its
current office space for the current rent. Contracts with parties other than Martineau and Trust
Deed beneficiary rights each fail to relieve Miller and Kimball of their obligations under the
lease.
Foreclosure became unavailable to Miller and Kimball when the debt supporting the
foreclosure lost its practical reality. When the debtor and the creditor became one, and when the
property owner and Trust Deed beneficiary became one, and when the landlord and Trust Deed
beneficiary became one, the foreclosure became an abuse of process. In addition, Miller and
Kimball should not be allowed to benefit from a judicial sale after intentionally designing the
sale process to discourage potential bidders.
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The default judgment against Martineau does not govern any more than the original
relative priority of the Lender's property interest over Martineau's leasehold interest. It altogether
fails to resolve Miller and Kimball's agreement to honor Martineau's Lease or Miller and
Kimball's right to foreclose on the basis of an artificially maintained debt. In the alternative,
fairness required the trial court to set aside the Default Judgment in light of subsequent
developments.
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees failed to sift out those fees which this Court has
declared not recoverable under Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition,
without a signed Temporary Restraining Order or written extension thereof, Rule 65 A does not
support an award of fees beyond the initial ten day period contemplated by the original verbal
restraining order.
IX.
ARGUMENT
A.

MILLER AND KIMBALL AGREED TO HONOR MARTINEAU'S LEASE. MILLER
AND KIMBALL COULD NOT UNILATERALLY AVOID THEIR DIRECT
OBLIGATIONS TO MARTINEAU THROUGH AGREEMENTS WITH THIRI^
PARTIES.
1.

Miller and Kimball Promised to Honor Martineau's Lease.

When Miller and Kimball bought the Judge Building in June, 1993, they promised, in
writing, to assume all of the obligations of the landlord in Martineau's Lease. In the new Trust
Deed, Miller and Kimball covenanted to "comply with and observe Borrowers' obligations as
landlord under all leases of the property or any part thereof." (R. 1165, Addendum 6, p. 12.)
Miller and Kimball again covenanted, in the Assignment of Leases, "to observe and perform all
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obligations imposed upon lessor under the leases." (R. 1165, Addendum 9, p. 1). The
Assignment of Leases defines "leases" to include "all leases . . . now existing . . . . " (R. 1165,
Addendum 9, p. 1.)
Miller and Kimball's "fundamental" lease obligation was to allow Martineau to occupy
the premises for the time periods and for the rent amounts in the lease. (R. 1165, Addendum 2,
p. 1.) Therefore, Miller and Kimball (as substitute landlord) must allow Martineau to occupy the
leased premises for the rent amount stated in the lease.
2.

Concurrent Contractual Provisions Allowing Foreclosure Did Not Eliminate
Miller and Kimball's Duty to Honor Martineau's Lease.

Miller and Kimball incorrectly assume their agreements with the Lender, allowing or
requiring foreclosure, eliminate Miller and Kimball's landlord obligations. But, to the extent
Miller and Kimball's foreclosure rights jeopardize Martineau's leasehold, Miller and Kimball
have agreed, by accepting the obligations of the lease, to honor Martineau's leasehold, in spite of
a foreclosure. The lease obligations to which Miller and Kimball agreed to be bound provide:
(b) Lessee hereby subordinates its rights in this Lease to the lien of
any mortgage or deed of trust of lien or other security interest
resulting from any method of financing or refinancing which
encumbers or is intended to encumber the Building or the land
underlying such and to all advances subsequently made upon the
strength of such security. So long as Lessee is not in default
under the terms of this Lease, however, this Lease shall remain
in full force and effect for the full term hereof and shall not be
terminated as a result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu
thereof) of such mortgage or other security instrument to
which Lessee has subordinated its rights pursuant to this
Subparagraph. [Paragraph 33.] [emphasis added.]
Of all the lease terms and clauses, the above paragraph most specifically and directly
defines Martineau's rights in the event of foreclosure proceedings. Miller and Kimball have
11

expressly agreed to abide by these terms. This Court should enforce the above provision in spite
of any provision less specific to this issue. This can be accomplished by either (1) dismissing the
foreclosure for the reasons discussed below, or by (2) affirming the foreclosure and ordering, as a
matter of law, that the Martineau Lease remains effective following the foreclosure.
B.

PRINCIPALS OF EQUITY PROHIBIT MILLER AND KIMBALL FROM USING A
MANUFACTURED FORECLOSURE FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE.
As part of the June, 1993 purchase of the property, Miller and Kimball intentionally

designed a plan to complete the foreclosure of the property they had just acquired, purposely
create a situation to discourage potential bidders at the Sheriffs Sale, subordinate subsequent
debt to the trust deed being foreclosed, release the original obligor (Associates) from any liability
on the note (thus eliminating any incentive of such obligor to attend the sale or redeem the
property post-sale) - all for the purpose of terminating one selected lease in the building just
purchased.
A judicially supervised foreclosure sale should have as its purpose the maximum
protection of everyone's rights. A designed process to discourage bidders, increase the bid price,
or lower the desireablitiy of the sale runs counter to the purpose of the process. In the instant
case, Miller and Kimball have been allowed to do all of the above for the sole purpose of
terminating only one of the leases involved with the Judge Building. The circumstances
surrounding this transaction have, in effect, eliminated the debt which formed the initial basis of
the foreclosure. Certainly no substantive debt remained after the paperwork was completed.
A genuine debt is a prerequisite to a foreclosure. When the debt ends or ceases to be
genuine, the right to foreclose ends. Foreclosure, by definition, interferes with property rights.
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The law justifies such interference for only one reason: to pay a genuine priority debt. When the
debt is gone, the rationale underlying foreclosure rights is gone, and foreclosure rights go with it.
As part of the June 21, 1993 transaction, the original debtors, the Associates, were
released from their liability to the lender. (R. 1165, Addendum 4, p. 12.) Miller and Kimball
became the Trust Deed beneficiaries and the owners of the property securing the 1986 Trust
Deed. (R. 1165, Addendum 7). Therefore, they became the debtor and the creditor of the same
debt. Under these circumstances, for all practical purposes, the debt which justified foreclosure
ceased and the right to foreclose ceased. As one treatise explained:
As we have before seen, the debt is the principal thing, and the
mortgage is merely incident, and the question is, not whether the
mortgage is merged, but whether the acquisition by one person of
both the mortgaged land and the debt secured by the mortgage has
the effect of extinguishing or merging the debt. If the debt is
extinguished under such circumstances, the mortgage lien is
necessarily also extinguished, while if the debt remains the
mortgage lien also remains.
Tiffany, Law of Real Property. § 1479 p. 504. (emphasis added).
Miller and Kimball persuaded the trial court that they could proceed with foreclosure
because they did not intend a merger of legal title and the existing lien on the property. There are
authorities which support that proposition. But the real question is whether the property owner,
who is also the Trust Deed beneficiary, should be able to use this illusory debt to itself as a basis
for clearing title of inferior rights. Foreclosure of a person's debt to himself should not be a
means of interfering with others' property rights.
The body of law dealing with merger when a property owner
purports to "acquire" a mortgage encumbering the property is far
less substantial than that involving a mortgagee who acquires the
encumbered property. Merger is completely inapplicable to the
13

enforceability of a mortgage after the property owner "purchases"
it. The owner's payment to the mortgagee, the alleged purchase,
only constitutes payment of the debt supporting the mortgage with
a resulting extinguishment of the mortgage lien. Therefore,
because payment of a senior obligation necessarily advances
junior obligations in priority, the owner never should be permitted
to use the mortgage to clear the property title of junior liens. This
conclusion follows whether the owner is the original borrower, a
grantee of the borrower, or a grantee further removed in the chain
of title, [emphasis added.]
Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger. Vol. 40:283 Vand. L. Rev., pp 362-63, (1987).
Another treatise observes:
If the mortgage debt is extinguished, the mortgage itself is never
kept alive. Consequently there is automatic merger of the two
interests in the property and no intent on the part of the creditor
can keep them separate, [emphasis added.]
Osborne, Real Estate Finance Law. § 6.14 pp. 411-12.
As the same commentator states:
If the grantee had taken subject to the mortgage without assuming
its payment the only one personally liable is the mortgagor. Where
such a grantee takes an assignment of the mortgage, as a general
rule the debt secured by the mortgage is held to be extinguished
and personal liability on it cannot be enforced.... If the grantee
paid the amount of the debt for the assignment, the mortgagor
should be able to insist that it constituted payment of the debt
rather than purchase of it. The reason is that, although the grantee
incurred no personal obligation to pay off the mortgage,
nonetheless when he bought the land subject to it, his bargain
included as a part of the price the amount of the mortgage debt....
It would seem, therefore, that regardless of the value of the land,
when a grantee subject to the mortgage buys in the mortgage, he
cannot enforce any right on it against the mortgagor.
Osborne, Real Estate Finance Law. § 6.14 pp. 416-17.

14

Miller and Kimball should not equitably be allowed to use the judicial foreclosure
process inequitably. As indicated by the court in First Federal Savings and Loan Assn.,
Chickasha, Oklahoma v. Nath, 839 P.2d 1336, ftnt. 37 (Okla. 1992):
A sheriffs sale may be set aside when (1) the sale price is so
grossly inadequate that it shocks the conscience of the court; (2)
the sale price is grossly inadequate and the sale is tainted by
additional circumstances; or (3) the result is inequitable to one or
more of the parties before the court. It is the court's duty, whether
confirming or setting aside a sheriffs sale, to protect all parties
concerned. The sale must appear to be fair and proper in all
essential respects. United Oklahoma Bank v. Moss, Okl. 793 P.2d
1359, 1364 (1990). [italics in original] [emphasis added].
A judicial foreclosure sale intentionally designed to discourage bidders and created on an
artificial debt for the sole purpose of terminating a lease to which the Trust Deed beneficiary is
bound, is not equitable.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT IN CONSIDERING SUBSEQUENT EVENTS JUSTIFYING
RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT.

The trial court based its decision to allow the foreclosure primarily on the fact that
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was not timely filed. (R. 1549-1553). The
trial court erred in concentrating on the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. Such Motion
was filed eleven months after issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order as a precautionary
measure only - a result of concern by Appellee's counsel that without such a Motion on record all
of the issues before the trial court would not be at issue.
The real issue before the trial court were events that occurred after the entry of the
Default Judgment - events giving rise to legal or equitable claims that the 1986 Trust Deed was
either extinguished, or otherwise was inequitably used for an unjust purpose. The convoluted
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sales documents and legal gyrations surrounding the June, 1993 sale to Miller and Kimball were
designed intentionally to discourage anyone from bidding at the pending Sheriffs sale. These
events occurred after the March 3, 1993 Default Judgment.
Inasmuch as the earlier Default Judgment merely established respective priorities as of
that date, it was incorrect to consider subsequent actions in the context of the situation that
existed in March of 1993.
The trial court is correct that the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed
approximately 18 months after the Default Judgment was entered. However, Martineau did not
know of facts justifying such relief for nearly nine months after the Default Judgment (March
1993 to November 1993). When Martineau discovered the facts surrounding the manufactured
Sheriffs Sale, it undertook action to "undo" the Default Judgment within a period of days. The
Motion to Dismiss filed on November 24, 1993 was tantamount to the Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment. Certainly, Martineau did not unduly delay in taking action when the facts of
the June 21, 1993 sale became known to him.
These are precisely the circumstances which Rule 60(b) contemplated. It provides that a
judgment may be set aside where "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application" or for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment." For purposes of determining whether Martineau moved to set aside the judgment
"within a reasonable time," the trial court should have measured that time from the date Miller
and Kimball relied upon terms which were not in the judgment, but which Miller and Kimball
implied from the judgment. In other words, even if the trial court agreed with Miller and
Kimball's interpretation of the default judgment, Miller and Kimball's reliance upon the strict
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language of the default judgment was reasonable enough and fair enough that the court should
have set aside the default judgment to allow the foreclosure issue to be resolved on the merits.
Therefore, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 24, that "Martineau's 18 month delay in moving to
set aside the default was not reasonable" ignores the circumstances which developed during those
18 months, which made in unfair to apply the default judgment in the manner proposed by Miller
and Kimball. (Addendum 13).
D.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES MISAPPLIED THE
LAW AND ABUSED THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.

Subsequent to the January, 1995 evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that Miller and
Kimball were entitled to $20,000 in attorneys fees. Such award was made pursuant to Rule
65A(c)(2) which reads:
(2) Amount not a limitation. The amount of security shall not
establish or limit the amount of costs, including reasonable
attorney fees incurred in connection with the restraining order or
preliminary injunction, or damages that may be awarded to a party
who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined.
Such award of fees is inappropriate because 1) the award of fees exceeds the scope of
Rule 65A and 2) the trial court failed to differentiate between fees which were arguably
"allowable" under the rule, and fees which clearly were not allowable.
1.

Appellees Are Not Entitled to Fees.

Appellant concedes that Miller and Kimball were initially restrained by the trial court,
even though no written Temporary Restraining Order was ever executed by the trial court. No
preliminary injunction was ever issued, verbally or in writing.
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Following entry of the verbal restraining order on November 23, 1993, Appellant's
counsel drafted a proposed order and circulated the same to counsel for Miller and Kimball
Counsel never approved the form of the order, nor returned the same to counsel for Appellants.
(R. 1205). The hearing on Appellant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction was heard more than
thirteen (13) months after the restraining order expired.
Any award of fees should be limited to any fees incurred during the ten day period
contemplated by the verbal temporary restraining order and should not cover fees incurred during
the more than thirteen (13) months when no restraining order nor injunction was in effect. The
more than thirteen (13) month delay in the preliminary injunction hearing occurred due to
Appellee's delay or requests for continuance of the hearing (R.1207).
Rule 65A(b)(2) reads in pertinent part:
The order shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not
to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so
fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period
or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that
it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the
extension shall be entered of record, (emphasis added).
No original restraining order was signed by the trial court, no extension was signed by the
trial court, and no reasons for any extension were "entered of record".
The trial court's order following the evidentiary hearing makes no determination that the
verbal restraining order was "wrongfully issued" or that Appellees were "wronfully restrained".
The order denied Appellants pending motions, including a request for entry of a preliminary
injunction.
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In Birch Creek Irrigation Co. v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme
Court reversed the trial court grant of a temporary restraining order and subsequent injunction
because there was no strict compliance with Rule 65A. The Court stated:
[T]he order failed to comply with the requirement that if a
temporary restraining order is extended, "the reasons for the
extension shall be entered of record." Utah R.Civ. P. 65A(b)
(1991). In fact, whether the order was ever extended remains in
dispute. Birch Creek claims that the order, originally set to expire
by its terms on July 8,1991, was extended by stipulation of the
parties. The Protheros, however, contend that they agreed to
continue only the hearing on the preliminary injunction motion.
The record supports the Protheros' position. Both the signed
stipulation for continuance and the resulting court order speak to
continuing only the hearing. Neither mentions the temporary
restraining order, although Birch Creek's counsel, appearing
unopposed, represented to the trial court that the stipulation
covered both the hearing date and the restraining order.
In light of these failings, we hold that the temporary
restraining order expired by its terms and is therefore no longer in
effect.
858P.2dat995.
Except for the ten day period contemplated by the original, verbal restraining order,
Miller and Kimball should not be awarded fees in this matter.
2.

The Trial Court Failed To Distinguish Between Allowable and Non-Allowable
Fees.

Even if Miller and Kimball are entitled to reasonable attorneys fees under Rule 65 A, the
trial court erred in failing 1o limit the fees to what is allowed under the rule.
The January 19, 1993 hearing considered 1) Appellant's request for issuance of a
preliminary injunction to stop the Sheriffs sale, 2) Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the pending
action as a result of the June, 1995 property sale to Miller and Kimball, 3) Appellant's Motion to
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Set Aside Default Judgment, and 4) several new substantive issues bearing on Appellees' right to
continue with the foreclosure (i.e. the contractual terms of the Lease, etc.). The preliminary
injunction request, heard over one year after expiration of the verbal temporary restraining order,
is the only matter considered by the trial court that arguably falls within the scope of allowable
attorneys fees under Rule 65A.
\ motion for a preliminary injunction, in and of itself, does not entitle Appellees to
reasonable attorneys fees. The other motions and issues do not entitle Appellees to reasonable
attorneys fees. I lie onh ' allowable fees under Rule 65A are those incurred from a "wrongful"
restraint. As observed above, the trial court never made a finding that the Appellees were
wrongfully restrained.
I his Com t observed in Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1993) that the
type of legal services for which attorneys' fees may be awarded is very narrow. This Court held
therein:
[4] Although Rule 65 A justifies awarding attorney fees to
wrongfully enjoined parties, those parties are only entitled to "fees
.. . incurred in defending against wrongfully obtained injunctive
relief and not to fees incurred in litigating the underlying lawsuit
associated with an injunction. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927,
933 (Utah App. 1990), remanded on other grounds, 806 P.2d 198
(Utah 1991). See also Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah
App. 1987) (fees incurred preparing and arguing summary
judgment were not properly awarded because they were not
incurred as a result of the injunction). Thus, in the present case,
Andy is entitled only to those attorney fees which would not have
been incurred but for the application for, and issuance of, the
preliminary injunction. Fees which would have been incurred
anyway, in the course of proving Sandy's entitlement to judgment
and refuting Tholen's defenses, are not recoverable under Rule
65A. (emphasis added.)
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Tholen at 597.
Fees incurred by Appellees, not directly related to the restraining order, should not have
been the subject of the trial court's award.
In this matter, Appellee's counsel conducted no discovery, took no depositions, and did
not engage in substantial legal proceedings. Much of the fees awarded included discussions
between counsel over settlement matters. The only Court proceedings involved were the initial
and informal temporary restraining order request to the Court, appearance at continued hearings,
attendance at the evidentiary hearing (less than one day), and the drafting of pleadings. Two
attorneys for Appellees attended the evidentiary hearing, resulting in duplicative and unnecessary
expense.
The trial court failed to make a sufficiently detailed examination of the attorneys' fees.
The court's finding provides:
8.
The Court has reviewed the Affidavit of Mark R. Gaylord
and Supplemental Affidavit of Mark R. Gaylord, has considered
the experience of the attorneys, the amount of time spent, and the
complexity of this matter.
9.
A substantial portion of the amount of time spent by
plaintiffs' counsel after the issuance of the temporary restraining
order on November 24, 1993, was spent in defense of the
temporary restraining order, motion for preliminary injunction, and
motion to set aside default judgment.
10.
The billing statements of Suitter Axland & Hanson contain
some duplication of effort in this matter, and deductions have been
made for time spent for specific items where deemed appropriate.
(R. 1329-1334, Addendum 14).
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